The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain: A Constitutional Liberty under Attack by Epstein, William
Pace Law Review
Volume 4
Issue 2 Winter 1984 Article 3
January 1984
The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of
Eminent Domain: A Constitutional Liberty under
Attack
William Epstein
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the School of Law at DigitalCommons@Pace. It has been accepted for inclusion in Pace Law
Review by an authorized administrator of DigitalCommons@Pace. For more information, please contact cpittson@law.pace.edu.
Recommended Citation
William Epstein, The Public Purpose Limitation on the Power of Eminent Domain: A Constitutional
Liberty under Attack, 4 Pace L. Rev. 231 (1984)
Available at: http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss2/3
Articles
The Public Purpose Limitation on the
Power of Eminent Domain: A
Constitutional Liberty Under Attack
WILLIAM EPSTEINt
I. Introduction
In Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit,' the
Supreme Court of Michigan approved a plan by Detroit to ac-
quire by condemnation a large tract of land, on which was lo-
cated a long established residential and commercial neighbor-
hood, in order to convey it to the General Motors Corporation as
a site for the construction of an assembly plant. When first an-
nounced in 1981, the decision provoked a mild ripple of national
protest.' Most people, however, noting that the city and the au-
tomobile industry were suffering at the depths of a great reces-
sion, begrudgingly accepted Detroit's plan as but one further
step in governmental attempts to revive industry and employ-
ment.' As this Article will show, the public's initial misgivings
were well founded. In fact, the Poletown decision is unprece-
dented in American law and represents a significant encroach-
ment on constitutional rights. Specifically, applying the doctrine
t B.A., City College of New York; J.D., Northwestern University School of Law;
LL.M., Columbia University School of Law; Associate Professor, New York Law School.
1. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
2. The national protestors were, among others, Ralph Nader, who sent staff to insti-
tute protests, and Stuart Mott, the well-known philanthropist who gave donations to the
Poletown Neighborhood Council. Local opponents included, of course, the Poletown
Neighborhood Council. Blonston, Poletown: The Profits, The Loss, Detroit Free Press,
Nov. 22, 1981, Magazine, at 10-11.
3. Among those who supported this plan locally were the United Auto Workers, the
Archdiocese of Detroit, and Coleman A. Young, Mayor of Detroit. On the national scene,
both Carter and Reagan evidenced support. Id. at 8.
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of eminent domain4  to the factual situation presented in
Poletown exceeded the public purpose limitation on the power
of eminent domain. Although this limitation has been liberally
construed in recent decades, no decision before Poletown had
sanctioned this degree of governmental assistance to private en-
terprise.5 The purpose of this Article is to explain the nature of
the public purpose barrier to governmental takings as it relates
to direct governmental aid to private business and to determine
its position in the American scheme of liberty.
II. The Poletown Decision
The Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit' de-
cision is the proper place to begin examining the circumstances
under which the power of eminent domain can and cannot be
used to aid private enterprise. In 1980, when the plan in ques-
tion was first proposed, Detroit was in the grips of a badly dete-
riorating economy.7 The high cost of doing business in Michigan
4. Eminent domain has been defined as
the right or power to take private property for public use. More precisely, it is the
right of the nation or the state, or of those to whom the power has been lawfully
delegated, to condemn private property for public use, and to appropriate the
ownership and possession of such property for such use on paying the owner a due
compensation to be ascertained according to law.
29A C.J.S. Eminent Domain § 1 (1965). In Woodmere Cemetery v. Roulo, 104 Mich. 595,
62 N.W. 1010 (1895), the court stated that eminent domain is "the rightful authority
which exists in every sovereignty to control and regulate those rights of a public nature
which pertain to its citizens in common, and to appropriate and control individual prop-
erty for the public benefit, as the public safety, necessity, convenience, or welfare may
demand." Id. at 599, 62 N.W. at 1011 (quoting T. COOLEY, A TREATISE ON THE CONSTrrU-
TIONAL LIMITATIONS WHICH REST UPON THE LEGISLATIVE POWER OF THE STATES OF THE
AMERICAN UNION 643 (6th ed. 1890)).
5. Prior to Poletown, the most extreme example of private assistance arising from
the exercise of eminent domain was seen in the urban renewal cases, where blighted
areas were condemned, the slums cleared, and the land reconveyed to private developers.
See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954). In these cases, however, it was consid-
ered that the public benefit was gained when the blighted buildings were razed, and thus
the subsequent reconveyance was merely an indirect private benefit.
6. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
7. Id. at 647, 304 N.W.2d at 465 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Unemployment had reached
crisis proportions throughout the State of Michigan (14.2%), but particularly in the City
of Detroit (18%). Among Detroit's black citizens unemployment was almost 30%. Many
manufacturers were driven out of the state due to high business costs. The life blood of
Detroit, the auto industry, was .floundering with all four of the leading corporations re-
porting losses due to overseas competition. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
[Vol. 4:231
2http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss2/3
EMINENT DOMAIN
had caused many businesses to flee to sunbelt states.8 Unem-
ployment in Detroit stood at eighteen percent.9 Chrysler Corpo-
ration was surviving thanks only to a federally insured loan. 0
The Ford Motor Company, the American Motors Corporation,
and the General Motors Corporation all continued to sustain
heavy losses." Moreover, in order to combat competition from
foreign manufacturers and compensate for the greatly increased
price of gasoline, the automobile manufacturers felt compelled
to plan for a new generation of smaller, cheaper, more efficient
cars. 1 Fearing that its old Cadillac and Fisher Body plant in
Detroit could not be renovated in conformity with modern pro-
duction technology, General Motors planned to close these old
facilities and to build a new plant elsewhere.' 3 This was the
bleak context in which General Motors made its first overtures
to the city about finding an appropriate new site in Detroit.
Only one site met all of General Motors' needs, and this 465 acre
area was rapidly approved for acquisition, redevelopment, and
transfer by the city.' The cost to the public of acquiring the
land and preparing it for redevelopment was to be over $200
million.' 5 General Motors, however, was to pay the city little
more than $8 million upon transfer of title.' 6 Moreover, the com-
pany insisted that Detroit move rapidly." For many months city
officials worked with great speed to meet-the company's de-
8. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
9. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
10. See id. (Ryan, J., dissenting). "It is appropriate to take judicial notice of the fact
that the view is widely held that the Chrysler Corporation . . . is 'on the ropes'.
Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
11. Each reported the largest losses in its history. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
12. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
13. Id. at 649, 304 N.W.2d at 466 (Ryan, J., dissenting). In explaining General Mo-
tors' motivation, Justice Ryan pointed to the inability of the old plants to meet more
stringent emission control standards and cost and size problems presented by trying to
convert an old plant to a spacious new one. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting) (citing City of
Detroit Community & Economic Development Department, Draft Environmental Impact
Statement: Central Industrial Park, The Cities of Detroit and Hamtramck, Michigan
(Oct. 15, 1980), p. 11-4).
14. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 652-56, 304 N.W.2d at 467-69 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
15. Id. at 656, 304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting). The public sector costs were
projected to be $201,450,000. Id. at 656 n.7, 304 N.W.2d at 469 n.7 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
16. Id. at 656, 304 N.W.2d at 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
17. Id. at 652-56, 304 N.W.2d at 468-69 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
1984]
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mands.'1 The use of Michigan's "quick-take" condemnation
statute19 permitted a swift beginning to the taking process.
Before long, the property owners in the target area, including
the mostly elderly and largely Polish-American residents of the
neighborhood known as Poletown,20 found themselves in the
shadow of the wrecker's iron ball. In the face of this fast moving
threat to their homes and businesses, the property owners sued
to enjoin the plan.2
Unfortunately for the property owners, the Michigan judici-
ary moved as quickly to approve the plan as the executive and
legislative authorities of Detroit had moved to commence action
18. Id. at 652-56, 304 N.W.2d at 467-69 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
19. MICH. COMP. LAws ANN. § 213.51-.77 (West Supp. 1982-1983). This statute sets
out procedures for public and private agencies to acquire property through eminent do-
main. Before the negotiations for purchase, the condemning agency has to determine
"just compensation." The necessity of the taking, as established by the agency, is bind-
ing on the courts unless there is evidence of "fraud" or "abuse of discretion." Id.
The Poletown dissenters characterized the statute as "quick take," which has been
generally defined as allowing the acquisition of the affected private property prior to an
ultimate adjudication for just compensation. A meritorious argument has been made that
a statute which permits transfer of title and possession prior to a final determination of
ultimate rights constitutes seizure of private property without due process of law. Acker-
man & Yanich, Eminent Domain: The Constitutionality of Condemnation Quick-Take
Statutes, 60 U. DET. J. Urnt. L. 1, 2 (1982).
[U]nlike a debtor who can obtain damages for wrongful attachment, a Michigan
'quick-take' condemnee has no statutory remedy for damages incurred as a result
of a grossly inadequate deposit of 'estimates compensation.' Although the Michi-
gan 'quick-take' statute requires that the offer of 'estimated compensation' be
made in 'good faith,' judicial reluctance to find that any offer - no matter how
inadequate - was not made in good faith has effectively foreclosed the existence
of a remedy.
Id. at 17 (footnotes omitted).
20. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 658, 304 N.W.2d at 470 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
21. Following a 10-day non-jury trial, the Wayne County Circuit Court approved the
exercise of eminent domain. As their second claim, the plaintiffs had challenged the pro-
ject under a state environmental protection statute. The trial court also dismissed this
claim, stating that the statute did not extend to cultural, social, and historical institu-
tions. Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of Detroit, No. 80-039-426 CZ, slip op. at
21 (Wayne County Cir. Ct. Dec. 8, 1980). Plaintiffs appealed to the court of appeals on
December 12, 1980, and applied to the Supreme Court of Michigan for a leave to appeal
prior to decision by the court of appeals on December 15, 1980. The Supreme Court of
Michigan granted the motion for immediate consideration and bypass, and affirmed the
trial court's decision on both claims on February 13, 1981. In a final challenge to the
project, several Poletown residents filed an unsuccessful environmental action in federal
district court under the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969, 42 U.S.C. §§ 4321-
4370 (1977 & Supp. IV 1983). See Crosby v. Young, 512 F. Supp. 1363 (E.D. Mich. 1981).
4http://digitalcommons.pace.edu/plr/vol4/iss2/3
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upon it. Considering the speed at which it was issued, it is not
surprising that the per curiam majority opinion of the Supreme
Court of Michigan is brief, without justification, and lacking au-
thority in support of this unprecedented decision.2 2 The core of
the decision is perfunctory: "The power of eminent domain is to
be used in this instance primarily to accomplish the essential
public purposes of alleviating unemployment and revitalizing
the economic base of the community. '23 The court decided that
General Motors' private gain was merely incidental to the over-
all public benefit of creating further employment.24 In structur-
ing its decision on a public purpose, the court utilized a broad
public benefit standard which had been established through leg-
islative interpretations and had been employed by prior Michi-
gan case law; notably, slum clearance cases.2 5
However, in strongly worded and detailed dissenting opin-
ions, Justices Fitzgerald and Ryan articulated the issues and
problems that they saw in the Poletown taking. Justice Fitzger-
ald argued that the legislative determination of public benefit
should have been reviewed.2 6 More importantly, he believed the
taking was unconstitutional since it was for a private use with
only an incidental public benefit,27 a diametrically opposed con-
clusion from that of the majority.
Justice Ryan concurred with Justice Fitzgerald in his criti-
cism of the majority's deference to the legislative determina-
tion.26 He also took issue with the majority's finding of public
necessity and their unwillingness to scrutinize what degree of
control the public would have over General Motors to insure a
22. The court relied on the policy of deferring to the legislature on declarations of
the public interest in attempting to justify its conclusion. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 633,
304 N.W.2d at 459.
23. Id. at 634, 304 N.W.2d at 459.
24. Id.
25. See In re Slum Clearance, 331 Mich. 714, 50 N.W.2d 340 (1951); General Dev.
Corp. v. City of Detroit, 322 Mich. 495, 33 N.W.2d 919 (1948); In re Jeffries Homes
Hous. Project, 306 Mich. 638, 11 N.W.2d 272 (1943); In re Brewster St. Hous. Site, 291
Mich. 313, 289 N.W.2d 493 (1939).
26. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 638-39, 304 N.W.2d at 461-62 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
27. Id. at 640-41, 304 N.W.2d at 462 (Fitzgerald, J., dissenting).
28. Id. at 667-69, 304 N.W.2d at 475 (Ryan, J., dissenting). Justice Ryan points out
that whether a taking is public or private is a judicial determination, a position sup-
ported by Michigan case law. Id. (Ryan, J., dissenting).
1984]
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public benefit. 29 Justice Ryan noted that the necessity had been
created because of the specifications set forth by General Motors
Corporation to increase their profit margin; not to eliminate re-
gional unemployment. 30 Therefore, any economic benefit to the
public would stem from the private use of the property by Gen-
eral Motors. Justice Ryan also emphasized that General Motors
is responsible only to its stockholders, not the public and that
the level of employment at the Poletown plant will be deter-
mined by private corporate managers, negating any public lever-
age on the internal operations of General Motors.3 1
The lack of authority cited by the court in support of the
Poletown decision is not surprising, as the decision is contrary to
a long, previously unbroken tradition of American law forbid-
ding condemnation in direct aid of private enterprises2 except
under certain circumstances not present in Poletown. To under-
stand why Poletown is bad law, the general rule relating to the
public use barrier and its exceptions must first be reviewed.
A. The General Rule and the Exceptions
The fifth amendment to the Constitution of the United
States provides the basic foundation from which the public pur-
pose barrier to the power of eminent domain has evolved: "[No
person shall] be deprived of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law; nor shall private property be taken for pub-
lic use, without just compensation."3 3 Moreover, with minor var-
iations, the public purpose barrier is also part of the constitu-
tional law of all of the states.34
The general rule that condemnation cannot be used in di-
rect aid of private enterprise is well illustrated in the recent case
29. Id. at 667-81, 304 N.w.2d at 474-80 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
30. Id. at 676, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
31. Id. at 679, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
32. See infra note 42 and accompanying text.
33. U.S. CONST. amend. V (emphasis added).
34. Article I, § 7(a) of the New York Constitution provides in relevant part: "Private
property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation . N.Y. CoNsT.
art. I, § 7(a) (emphasis added).
Some states' constitutions have minor variations. See, e.g., CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 19,
which provides in relevant part the following: "Private property may be taken or dam-
aged for public use only when just compensation . . .has first been paid to . .. the
owner." Id. (emphasis added).
[Vol. 4:231
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of Karesh v. City Council of Charleston." There, Charleston
proposed a joint undertaking with a private corporation involv-
ing the redevelopment of a city block on which many active
businesses were located.3 6 Under the plan, the corporation would
purchase a portion of the block and construct a hotel, a major
department store, and a restaurant.3 7 The city would then ac-
quire the remaining portions of the block by purchase or con-
demnation and permit the corporation to construct a 500 car
parking garage and a convention center on the land.3 8 The ga-
rage and the convention center were to be leased on a long term
basis to the corporation and operated as adjuncts to the hotel.39
Both were to contain retail shops which the corporation would
sublet to new merchants, rather than to those merchants dis-
placed by the project.40 Based upon these facts, the Supreme
Court of South Carolina ruled that the plan was
unconstitutional:
We conclude that the proposed undertaking by the City of
Charleston and Holywell Corporation fails constitutionally be-
cause it envisions the utilization of the power of eminent domain
for a taking of private property which will not be devoted to a
public use. However attractive the proposed complex, however
desirable the project from a municipal planning viewpoint, the
use of the power of eminent domain for such purposes runs
squarely into the right of an individual to own property and use it
as he pleases.41
A long line of cases from across the country stretching well back
into the nineteenth century leaves no doubt that the South Car-
olina court correctly applied the general rule against direct gov-
ernmental aid to private enterprise through the exercise of emi-
nent domain. 'a
35. 271 S.C. 339, 247 S.E.2d 342 (1978).
36. Id. at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 343.
37. Id.
38. Id.
39. Id. at 343, 247 S.E.2d at 344. The lease was to pay for and secure revenue bonds,
which the city planned to issue. The bonds would pay for the cost of constructing the
convention center and parking facility. Id. at 341, 247 S.E.2d at 344.
40. Id. at 343, 247 S.E.2d at 344-45.
41. Id. at 344-45, 247 S.E.2d at 345.
42. See, e.g., City of Gary v. Much, 94 N.E. 583 (Ind. App. 1911) (declaring as un-
constitutional a plan to vacate a city street in order to give that land to a private corn-
1984]
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While the general rule against such direct governmental aid
to private enterprise has remained unchanged throughout Amer-
ican history, there has always been controversy as to which cir-
cumstances constituted legitimate exceptions to the rule.43 The
great caution with which courts have declared exceptions, and
their readiness to return to the general rule when exceptional
circumstances were not presented, indicate how deeply this gen-
eral rule is ingrained in traditional constitutional principles.
Traditionally, exceptions to the rule have been declared in cases
where the private enterprise aided by condemnation is indispen-
sable to the economy of the entire community and direct govern-
mental assistance is indispensable to that enterprise.44 This ex-
ception will be referred to as the "indispensability exception."
Recently, however, another exception has evolved. This excep-
tion holds that private business can benefit indirectly as a result
of condemnation made for a different, legitimate public pur-
pose.45 This exception will be referred to as the "indirect benefit
exception." The legitimate public purpose most often found in
indirect benefit exception cases is slum clearance. A review of
some of the decisions throughout history which have been
deemed exceptions to the general rule will show that the
Poletown decision is truly a drastic departure.
pany); Opinion of the Justices, 152 Me. 440, 131 A.2d 904 (1957) (advising that condem-
nation for the benefit of private industrial development is unconstitutional); Lowell v.
Boston, 111 Mass. 454 (1873) (declaring as unconstitutional a plan to rebuild private
buildings after a fire).
43. The conflict in the earlier eminent domain cases centered on the interpretation
of "public use." The narrow reading, where the public must be guaranteed access to the
property acquired, eventually gave way to the broader interpretation of a tangible public
benefit, or mere public advantage, as in public utilities and works. Condemnation for the
benefit of private enterprise was seldom at issue. Note, Public Use, Private Use, and
Judicial Review in Eminent Domain, 58 N.Y.U. L. REv. 409, 413-14 (1983). In the 1940's
and 1950's, courts were faced with determining the constitutionality of the most notable
exception to the public use requirement: urban renewal. Most courts found slum clear-
ance to be a valid public purpose. See, e.g., Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26 (1954); New
York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936). There were, how-
ever, some decisions holding urban renewal by the statutory power of eminent domain
unconstitutional. See Adams v. Hous. Auth., 60 So. 2d 663 (Fla. 1952); Housing Auth. of
Atlanta v. Johnson, 209 Ga. 560, 74 S.E.2d 891 (1953); Edens v. City of Columbia, 228
S.C. 563, 91 S.E.2d 280 (1956). Since Berman, most of these latter decisions are no longer
followed.
44. See infra notes 46-89 and accompanying text.
45. See infra notes 90-109 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4:231
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B. The Indispensability Exception
The types of private enterprises which have at times been
held to be indispensable to the entire community and have,
therefore, warranted departures from the general rule under the
indispensability exception have been largely limited to railroads,
mills, irrigation projects, drainage projects, and port facilities. 6
The cases reveal that the standard used by courts in deciding
whether an enterprise and direct governmental aid to it are in-
dispensable is very high."
The indispensability exception is well illustrated in the
landmark Michigan case of People ex rel. Detroit & Howell
Railroad v. Township Board of Salem,5 decided in 1870. In that
case, several townships were authorized to pledge their credit to
aid in the construction of a private railroad.' 9 Although the case
concerned the power of taxation, the court, as have later
courts, 0 saw the pivotal issue to be one which these kinds of
taxation controversies have in common with condemnation con-
troversies." The court in its decision noted that direct govern-
mental assistance to railroads was originally considered an ex-
46. See, e.g., Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co., 36 Cal. App. 556,
178 P. 150 (1918) (irrigation project); Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz Land & Coal Co., 77
Kan. 599, 95 P. 559 (1908) (mills); Marchant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 126 A.
884 (1924) (harbor development); People v. Salem, 20 Mich. 452 (1870) (railroads); Cour-
tesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240
N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78 (1963) (port facility); Sublett v. City of Tulsa,
405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965) (port facility).
47. An example is found in Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz Lumber & Coal Co., 77
Kan. 599, 95 P. 559 (1908). The court held that the mill's business activity added to the
general prosperity but that this public benefit was not enough. To invoke the right of
eminent domain the business "must be one in which the public has an exceptional and
peculiar interest." Id. at 609, 95 P. at 563.
48. 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
49. Id. at 470.
50. See, e.g., In re Legislature's Request for an Opinion on the Constitutionality of
Chapter 2 of Amendatory Act No. 100 of the Public Acts of 1970 (Enrolled Senate Bill
No. 1082), 384 Mich. 82, 180 N.W.2d 265 (1970) (upholding as constitutional, under the
public purpose standard of Salem, the State School Aid Act authorizing purchase of
services of lay teachers to teach secular subjects in non-public schools); Michigan Sugar
Co. v. Auditor Gen., 124 Mich. 674, 83 N.W. 625 (1900) (utilizing the standard of Salem,
and holding unconstitutional, as authorizing tax for private purpose, payment of boun-
ties to state sugar manufacturers). See also Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26, 32 (1954)
("The role of the judiciary in determining whether [the] power [of eminent domain] is
being exercised for a public purpose is an extremely narrow one.").
51. People ex rel. Detroit & Howell R.R. v. Township Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. at 474.
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ception to the general rule because such assistance had been
critical to the growth of railroads which, much like public high-
ways, had been critical to overall community development.52 The
court went on to note, however, that while highways had re-
mained a purely public concern, railroads had become largely
conventional private enterprises: "[Railroads] are not, when in
private hands, the people's highways; but they are private prop-
erty, whose owners make it their business to transport persons
and merchandise in their own carriages, over their own land, for
such pecuniary compensation as may be stipulated.""3 Direct
governmental aid to railroads was, therefore, no longer indispen-
sable to the railroads or the community.54 The forces of private
enterprise would henceforth guarantee the growth of rail service:
It was at one time in this State deemed true policy that the gov-
ernment should supply railroad facilities to the traveling and
commercial public, and while that policy prevailed, the right of
taxation for the purpose was unquestionable. Our policy in that
respect has changed; railroads are no longer public works, but pri-
vate property; individuals and not the State own and control
them for their own profit; the public may reap many and large
benefits from them, and indeed are expected to do so, but only
incidentally, and only as they might reap similar benefits from
other modes of investing private capital.58
Therefore, the indispensability exception was no longer applica-
ble to the facts of that case.
Since People ex rel. Detroit & Howell Railroad v. Township
Board of Salem, this strict interpretation of the indispensability
exception to the rule against public aid to private enterprise has
been repeated in cases across the country. One historical exam-
ple is found in the Kansas case of Howard Mills Co. v. Schwartz
Lumber & Coal Co., 56 decided in 1908. The mill company sought
to condemn neighboring land pursuant to a statute granting the
power of eminent domain to public mills. In its opinion, the
court acknowledged that public mills had been granted condem-
52. Id. at 477.
53. Id. at 478.
54. See id. at 479.
55. Id. at 485.
56. 77 Kan. 599, 95 P. 559 (1908).
[Vol. 4:231
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nation power by statute as early as 1868.57 The type of mill
given authority to exercise governmental powers in this first and
in later statutes, however, was one which was indispensable to
the community: "The language used in the statute applies to
and describes the old-fashioned grist mill - a mill operated for
the accommodation of the public; a mill upon which the citizens
for miles around were compelled to depend for the meal and
flour from which their daily bread was made ... "58 The days
of the grist mill, however, were rapidly passing into history.
Howard Mills Company, in fact, was the new, modern sort of
mill, strictly an enterprise operated for private profit: "The mill
of the defendant company . . . belongs to an entirely different
category. It neither does, nor offers to do, such a grist mill busi-
ness."59 Not being indispensable to the community, the company
was denied the power to exercise condemnation pursuant to the
public mill statute.60
A similar result was reached in Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v.
Pope & Talbot Land Co.," a 1918 case from California involving
irrigation. A 1911 statute, recodifying earlier statutes, declared
irrigation to be a public necessity and provided that the power
of eminent domain could be exercised by private companies in
pursuit of the fulfillment of public irrigation needs.2 It was con-
ceded by the irrigation company involved there, that the pur-
pose of its proposed condemnation was to irrigate exclusively its
own farm lands." The court clearly found that the company's
proposed use was purely private and therefore fell outside the
scope of the statute." Similar reasoning was demonstrated in
H.A. Bosworth & Son, Inc. v. Tamiola,"' a 1963 case from Con-
necticut dealing with the related problem of drainage. In this
case, a private landowner desired to drain some land for devel-
57. Id. at 605, 95 P. at 561.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 609, 95 P. at 562-63.
61. 36 Cal. App. 556, 178 P. 150 (1918).
62. Act of May 1, 1911, ch. 719, 1911 Cal. Stat. 1407. The Act was entitled: "An Act
regarding irrigation and declaring the same to be a public use." Id.
63. Gravelly Ford Canal Co. v. Pope & Talbot Land Co., 36 Cal. App. at 559, 178 P.
at 151.
64. Id. at 559, 178 P. at 151-53.
65. 24 Conn. Supp. 328, 190 A.2d 506 (1963).
19841
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opment into lots and streets.66 Relying upon an old but still ac-
tive statute declaring drainage to be a public use for purposes of
eminent domain,67 the landowner sought to condemn nearby
land.68 In denying that the landowner had an absolute right
under statutory law to condemnation, the court stated the indis-
pensability exception succinctly:
At the present time, the exercise of the right of eminent domain
by an owner of land for drainage over adjacent land . . . may no
longer be, in every instance, of general benefit or great advantage
to the community. In many situations, the right may be sought
primarily for private enhancement or gain, with only such inci-
dental general benefit or community advantage as might accrue
from any successful private endeavor. Thus it is possible for the
• . . Drainage Act to operate constitutionally in one situation and
unconstitutionally in another.69
Private benefit alone, in other words, could not justify a devia-
tion from the general rule. Time had not erased the old statute
from the books. The court, however, relying upon the indispens-
ability exception, severely restricted its scope to those projects
greatly benefiting the public as originally contemplated by the
legislature.7
Cases involving the indispensability of private railroads,
mills, irrigation projects, and drainage projects to the public may
appear to be matter from the distant past and therefore argua-
bly of little relevance to the problems of modern industry faced
by the Poletown court. But the rules of law applied by courts in
both old and contemporary cases involving port and harbor de-
velopment demonstrate that the principles applied in the older
cases have survived the passage of time intact.
The application of the indispensability exception in a mod-
ern case involving port development is illustrated in the
66. Id. at 329, 190 A.2d at 507.
67. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 52-456 (West 1960).
68. H.A. Bosworth & Son, Inc. v. Tamiola, 24 Conn. Supp. at 329, 190 A.2d at 507-
08.
69. Id. at 335, 190 A.2d at 510.
70. Id. at 332-33, 190 A.2d at 509. See also Smith v. Cameron, 106 Or. 1, 210 P. 716
(1922) (public benefits insufficient to show public use of privately owned irrigation
ditch).
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Oklahoma case of Sublett v. City of Tulsa,71 decided in 1965.
Acting in concert with the county port authority, the city
planned to acquire land abutting the port of Tulsa by eminent
domain, to redevelop that land as an industrial park, and lease
the land and facilities on a long-term basis to the authority."
The plan was part of a long-term federal, state, and local effort
to improve the Arkansas River for purposes of navigation, hy-
droelectric power, flood control, and irrigation.7 3 The court, in
approving the plan, was able to cite numerous cases, both older
and more recent, from across the country in support of its con-
clusion that port development was and had traditionally been
considered indispensable to community well-being. 4 Among
those cases it relied upon was the 1924 Maryland case of
Marchant v. Mayor of Baltimore7 5 which quoted the following
rule from Dillon on Municipal Corporations7 6 a widely
respected treatise on municipal government: "To minister to the
necessities of commerce, by providing fit and proper places in a
seaport where ships can be loaded and unloaded with all proper
facilities, is a public duty owing by the state, and through it by
the municipality which governs and controls the port. '7 7 Refer-
ring to the city's right to lease the land and facilities following
redevelopment, the court again quoted from Marchant v. Mayor
of Baltimore, which this time quoted from the 1892 New York
case of In re Mayor of New York:78 "The use is public while the
property is thus leased, because it fills an undisputed necessity
existing in regard to common carriers by water, who are them-
selves engaged in fulfilling their obligations to the general pub-
lic, - obligations which could not otherwise be properly or ef-
71. 405 P.2d 185 (Okla. 1965).
72. Id. at 191.
73. Id. at 190-91.
74. Id. at 194. The decisions cited by the court in Sublett include: Commissioner v.
Ten Eyck, 76 F.2d 515 (2d Cir. 1935); Wayland v. Snapp, 232 Ark. 57, 334 S.W.2d 633
(1960); Marchant v. Mayor of Baltimore, 146 Md. 513, 126 A. 884 (1924); Visina v. Free-
man, 252 Minn. 177, 89 N.W.2d 635 (1958); Atwood v. Willacy County Navigation Dist.,
271 S.W.2d 137 (Tex. Civ. App. 1954), appeal dismissed, 350 U.S. 804 (1955).
75. 146 Md. 513, 126 A. 884 (1924).
76. J. DILLON, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAW OF MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS § 269 (5th
ed. 1911).
77. Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d at 195 (quoting Marchant v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 146 Md. at 521, 126 A. at 887 (quoting J. DILLON, supra note 76)).
78. 135 N.Y. 253, 31 N.E. 1043 (1892).
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fectually performed." 79 Similar results have been reached in
numerous, recent cases."0
The most important recent case involving the indispensabil-
ity of port development is the 1963 New York case of Courtesy
Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Authority.81 The impor-
tance of this case is that, prior to Poletown, many observers con-
sidered it to be the most radical case approving condemnation in
aid of private business in American law.8 2 A close examination of
the opinion, however, reveals that the case is more conservative
than is often believed and too far removed from the circum-
stances present in Poletown to serve as precedent for that case.
In Courtesy Sandwich Shop, the Port Authority proposed to ac-
quire and redevelop a large tract of land in lower Manhattan
near the port of New York.83 Among the projects to be devel-
oped on the land was an enormous multi-building complex, in-
cluding two towers over 100 stories high, to be known as the
World Trade Center.84 The statute empowering the entire rede-
velopment defined the Center as "a facility of commerce . . . for
the centralized accommodation of functions, activities and ser-
vices for or incidental to the transportation of persons, the ex-
change, buying, selling and transportation of commodities . ..
in world trade and commerce. ' '88 In other words, the purpose of
the Center was to encourage and provide for the centralization
of the city's private import-export businesses. The Authority
hoped to attract as tenants for the Center some of New York's
200 combination export managers, 2000 general exporters, 4200
79. Sublett v. City of Tulsa, 405 P.2d at 195 (quoting Marchant v. Mayor of Balti-
more, 146 Md. at 522, 126 A. at 887 (quoting In re Mayor of New York, 135 N.Y. at 265,
31 N.E. at 1046)).
80. See, e.g., Goodpasture v. TVA, 434 F.2d 760 (6th Cir. 1970); United States ex
rel. TVA v. Two Tracts of Land, 387 F. Supp. 319 (E.D. Tenn. 1974), aff'd, 532 F.2d
1083, cert. denied, 429 U.S. 827 (1976).
81. 12 N.Y.2d 379, 190 N.E.2d 402, 240 N.Y.S.2d 1, appeal dismissed, 375 U.S. 78
(1963).
82. See, e.g., Meidinger, The "Public Uses" of Eminent Domain: History and Pol-
icy, 11 ENvTL. L. 1, 63 (1980). "Courtesy Sandwich . . . may be the prototype of the
most important type of taking in the current era." Id.
83. Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d at 387, 190
N.E.2d at 404, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 4.
84. Id.
85. N.Y. UNCONSOL. LAWS § 6602 (McKinney 1979) (concurrent with N.J. STAT.
ANN. § 32:1-35.51 (West 1963)).
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general importers, and 2900 manufacturers which it claimed
were responsible for seventy-six percent of then current Ameri-
can exports."8 In order to acquire sufficient land for the project,
the Authority proposed to condemn a large number of buildings
which were part of an active commercial neighborhood whose
small buildings and narrow streets dated back to the nineteenth
century. The low rents charged for space in these old buildings
made the area a major center for discount wholesale and retail
sales and for light manufacturing. Despite the protests of the
owners of these buildings that a rental office complex did not
serve a legitimate public purpose, 7 the court approved of the
plan.8 8 But the approval rested upon a narrow and traditional
justification - that of the indispensability of port development
to general community well-being:
It is the gathering together of all business relating to world trade
that is supposed to be the great convenience held out to those
who use American ports and which is supposed to attract trade
with a resultant stimulus to the economic well-being of the Port
of New York. This benefit is not too remote or speculative as to
render the means chosen to achieve it patently unreasonable; nor
is the benefit sought itself an improper concern of government.
The history of western civilization demonstrates the cause and ef-
fect relationship between a great port and a great city. Fostering
harbor facilities has long been recognized by this court as a legiti-
mate concern of government.89
Thus the principle under which the court approved of the
Center was as old and established as the scale of the Center was
large and ambitious. At most, because of the scale of the project,
the decision may represent an expansion in extent of govern-
mental assistance permitted under the indispensability excep-
tion, but certainly no expansion in kind. After the controversy
subsided, this decision left the law virtually as it had found it.
86. Courtesy Sandwich Shop v. Port of New York Auth., 12 N.Y.2d at 393-94, 190
N.E.2d at 408, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 9 (Van Voorhis, J., dissenting).
87. Id. at 391, 190 N.E.2d at 406, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 7.
88. Id.
89. Id. at 388-89, 190 N.E.2d at 404-05, 240 N.Y.S.2d at 5 (citation omitted).
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C. The Indirect Benefit Exception
Within the last several decades, courts have developed a
new exception to the general rule forbidding the use of eminent
domain in direct aid of private enterprise, the indirect benefit
exception. In cases involving traditional exceptions to the gen-
eral rule, such as those concerning railroads, mills, irrigation and
drainage projects, and port development, courts have found a
public purpose in indispensable governmental assistance to a
private enterprise when that business was indispensable to the
community at large. In cases involving this new exception,
courts have found that the public purpose involved is the benefit
gained by the community at large, while the benefit of govern-
ment assistance to the private sector is merely an indirect inci-
dent of projects undertaken for the public good. So far, cases
decided under the indirect benefit exception have been limited
to those involving urban renewal projects.90 Proponents of the
Poletown decision argue that it can be justified on the same
grounds as the urban renewal cases.9 1 A review of the cases, how-
ever, shows that the issue faced in Poletown was a very different
one.
The first opinion which established that urban renewal was
a legitimate public purpose was the New York case of New York
City Housing Authority v. Muller,2 decided in 1936. Acting
pursuant to the power granted by the nation's first large-scale
urban renewal legislation," the Housing Authority sought to
condemn two nineteenth century tenements belonging to
Muller." These buildings, along with others nearby, were to be
razed in order to provide land for a public housing project for
90. The leading urban renewal exception case is Berman v. Parker, 348 U.S. 26
(1954). See also New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936)
(first New York recognition of indirect benefit exception for urban renewal).
91. For example, the city of Detroit based its justification for the Poletown taking
on slum clearance cases. It argued that selling the property to General Motors was con-
stitutional because selling property condemned for slum clearance was within constitu-
tional limits. Brief for Appellees at 33-35, Poletown Neighborhood Council v. City of
Detroit, 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
92. 270 N.Y. 333, 1 N.E.2d 153 (1936).
93. State Housing Law, ch. 823, 1926 N.Y. Laws 1507, amended by Municipal Hous-
ing Authorities Law, ch. 4, 1934 N.Y. Laws 13, repealed by Public Housing Law, ch. 808,
§ 227, 1939 N.Y. Laws 1978, 2039.
94. New York City Hous. Auth. v. Muller, 270 N.Y. at 337, 1 N.E.2d at 153.
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the poor.' 5 The impetus for the proposal was the finding that the
neighborhood was characterized by unsafe and unsanitary hous-
ing.' 6 The court acknowledged initially that this was a case of
first impression in American law.9 7 It then sought to fashion a
constitutionally permissible policy for the role of government in
the task of urban renewal. Private enterprise, it noted, lacked
the resources necessary to accomplish renewal on a large scale."
Governmental assistance was, therefore, needed:
The menace of the slums in New York City has been long recog-
nized as serious enough to warrant public action. The Session
Laws for nearly seventy years past are sprinkled with acts apply-
ing the taxing power and the police power in attempts to cure or
check it. The slums still stand. The menace still exists. What ob-
jections, then, can be urged to the application of the third power
[eminent domain], least drastic, but as here embodied probably
the most effective of all? 99
Although Muller was the first case to sanction the use of
eminent domain for purposes of urban renewal, it is really
closely related to cases decided under the traditional indispens-
ability exception. Prior to the mid to late nineteenth century,
most buildings in New York City were made of wood. "Urban
renewal" was a relatively simple and frequent matter. The
buildings at issue in Muller were among the earliest examples of
widespread construction in brick and other more long-lasting
materials. By the 1930's, after housing mostly poor immigrants
and other poor for generations, many of these buildings, often
built without adequate water, electricity, light, or air, were
crumbling and were unhealthy places in which to live.100 Experi-
ments with tax incentives and housing codes had long proven
inadequate. 10' Private business either could not or would not
cope with the problem. Experience had shown that direct gov-
ernmental intervention by the use of the power of eminent do-
95. Id.
96. Id.
97. Id. at 340, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
98. Id. at 341, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
99. Id.
100. See, e.g., id. at 338, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
101. Id. at 341, 1 N.E.2d at 155.
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main was indispensable to the job.' The Muller court, there-
fore, was the first American court to have the opportunity to
confront the problem of deteriorated older city neighborhoods.
In that sense, its decision was new. But in its application of es-
tablished legal doctrine, the decision was in accord with tradi-
tion. The principle which underlies Muller is the same as that
which underlies the older cases of railroads, mills, irrigation and
drainage projects, and port development - that government in-
volvement by eminent domain is indispensable to the project
and that the project is indispensable to the well-being of the
community.
The next landmark urban renewal case was Berman v.
Parker,'0 3 where, in 1954, the United States Supreme Court ap-
proved a redevelopment plan for an area of Washington, D.C.
The Court's enthusiastic endorsement of a wide range of renewal
projects has been cited and quoted with approval in innumera-
ble urban renewal cases from courts across the country: "The
concept of the public welfare is broad and inclusive. The values
it represents are spiritual as well as physical, aesthetic as well as
monetary."'' 0 In addition to this broad approval in principle, the
Court also addressed two controversial questions which have
arisen often in renewal cases since Muller. The first concerned a
challenge to the participation of private businesses in redevelop-
ment. At issue was whether the participation of private enter-
prises as owners or long-term tenants of the redeveloped land
negated the public purpose of the overall renewal project.105 Did
private participation and benefit mean that the taking of the
condemnee's land was for a private, rather than public, purpose?
Here, the Court ruled that the promotion of private enterprise
as part of a larger redevelopment plan was a legitimate indirect
benefit of the public purpose.10 6 The second issue was whether
sound structures located in the midst of a depressed area could
be taken along with deteriorated structures in order to gather
large tracts of land for redevelopment. Here again, the Court ap-
102. Id. at 339, 1 N.E.2d at 154.
103. 348 U.S. 26 (1954).
104. Id. at 33 (citation omitted).
105. Id. at 31.
106. Id. at 33-34.
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proved of the plan.10 7 Not only individual slum buildings, it
ruled, but also "blighted areas that tend to produce slums"' 8
were appropriate for redevelopment. After Berman v. Parker,
urban renewal was never again seriously challenged in principle
as a legitimate use of the power of eminent domain.' 09
Although Berman v. Parker settled any remaining contro-
versy concerning the constitutional legitimacy of the use of emi-
nent domain for purposes of urban renewal, the courts have con-
tinued to wrestle with many questions concerning the
constitutional propriety of individual redevelopment projects.
One important question which has continued to cause contro-
versy is the proper role of private enterprise in renewal projects.
Is governmental taking of property from one private owner in
order to transfer it to another private owner a legitimate use of
condemnation? Under what circumstances, if any, can eminent
domain be exercised when private enterprise is to participate
and benefit, and under what circumstances can it not? Can the
Poletown decision be justified on this basis? The jurisdiction
where this issue has most fully been litigated has been New
York. An examination of cases decided in New York and else-
where will show that these decisions do not provide precedent
for Poletown.
The first New York case of note on the question of the con-
stitutional limitations on the power of eminent domain when
used in direct aid of private business was City of Utica v. Dami-
ano,1 0 decided in 1959. There, the city sought to condemn land
in order to widen a street so as to provide a nearby land-locked
parcel of land with access to public roads."' The city's stated
purpose was to enhance the value of that land for the private
owner and thereby also to enhance its value to the city for pur-
poses of taxation." 2 Damiano, the condemnee, claimed that the
107. Id. at 34-35.
108. Id. at 35.
109. "Although Berman is not binding on state courts interpreting their own consti-
tutions, it has nevertheless been widely cited." Note, supra note 43, at 417 (footnotes
omitted). See also Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d 478, 483, 335
N.E.2d 327, 332, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112, 119 (1975).
110. 22 Misc. 2d 804, 193 N.Y.S.2d 295 (Oneida County Ct. 1959).
111. Id. at 806, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 298.
112. Id. at 806, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
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use of eminent domain to take his land in order to benefit that
of his neighbor was a taking for private, rather than public, pur-
pose.11 The court, noting that the public purpose limitation had
recently been more liberally interpreted, approved the condem-
nation." 4 But the scope of the decision was limited. The court
was persuaded by the fact that the only reason that the parcel
was land-locked was because, when the road was originally con-
structed, Damiano, over whose land the road was being built,
had misrepresented the access problem of the neighboring par-
cel.1 1 5 Quoting from an earlier New York case, which itself
quoted from an even earlier Iowa case, the court ruled that
"[t]he state is not bound to allow its citizens to be walled in,
insulated, imprisoned, but may provide them a way of deliver-
ance," I" and especially here, when the condemnee himself cre-
ated the problem.
The next New York case, Cannata v. City of New York," 7
decided in 1960, was of much greater significance. The con-
demnees in Cannata challenged the city's proposal to condemn
their properties in order to use their land as part of an industrial
redevelopment project.1 8 The City Planning Commission had
recommended this project after determining that the general
area was mostly vacant and that many of the existing structures
had deteriorated badly."' In addition, the Commission found
that
conditions in the area had led to a high incidence of tax delin-
quency, resulting in an impairment of the area's economic value;
that there was a multiplicity of lot ownership constituting a bar-
rier to economical land assembly through private action; that a
study of the area revealed that residential development had been
deterred because of the physical containment and isolation of the
113. Id. at 806, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 299.
114. Id. at 808-09, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 300-01.
115. Id. at 806, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 298-99.
116. Id. at 809, 193 N.Y.S.2d at 301 (quoting In re Town of Whitestown, 24 Misc.
150, 152, 53 N.Y.S. 397, 399 (Oneida County Ct. 1898) (quoting Bankhead v. Brown, 25
Iowa 540, 546 (1868))).
117. 24 Misc. 2d 694, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 14
A.D.2d 813, 221 N.Y.S. 457 (2d Dep't 1961), affd, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227
N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 4 (1962).
118. Id. at 695-97, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 985-86.
119. Id. at 697, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 986.
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area from adjacent neighborhoods; that there was a substantial
industrial section with sizable plots in part of the area and that
[extensive and costly filling operations were required to prepare
the land for residential construction]. 120
In view of these circumstances, the Commission found that the
usual operations of private enterprise would be ineffective in
promoting development of the area; thus public participation
was necessary for the removal of the blighted sites and for the
orderly growth of the larger area.121 Given these circumstances,
the court approved of the plan.122 But again, the scope of the
decision was carefully and narrowly drawn:
Where, as in this case, the purpose for the acquisition of the land
is designed to facilitate other projects such as slum clearance,
which are incontrovertibly in the public interest, by providing for
relocation of establishments displaced by such projects, such ac-
quisition may be deemed under such circumstances, to constitute
a needful adjunct to such projects and thus considered to be for a
public purpose. . . . [A]nd if it appears that upon completion of
the project the public good will be enhanced, it is of no moment
that private interests may be benefited thereby.128
The decision, although an expansion of prior law, contains
several important limitations. First, the area in question was a
slum or at least generally blighted.12 4 Second, the relocation of
industry on the site was part of a broader plan to clear slums
and blighted areas city-wide and to encourage businesses dis-
placed by other clearance projects to remain in the city.2 5
Third, the area required governmental assistance in order to ac-
complish redevelopment, the private sector having failed in its
efforts. 2 Finally, the benefit to private enterprise was only inci-
dental to the primary purpose of clearing slums and general
blight. 12 7 The decision, in other words, has much more in com-
mon with earlier exceptions to the general rule which forbid the
120. Id. at 698, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
12i. Id.
122. Id. at 700, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
123. Id. at 702, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 991 (footnotes omitted).
124. Id. at 699-700, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 989.
125. Id. at 701-02, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
126. Id. at 698, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 987.
127. Id. at 702, 204 N.Y.S.2d at 991.
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use of condemnation for the benefit of private enterprise than
with the decision in Poletown. Whatever private benefit accrues,
it must be incidental to the overall redevelopment plan, which
itself must be indispensable to an otherwise legitimate public
purpose, such as the clearance of an individual slum or blighted
area. In addition, private profit must be incidental to another
recognized benefit to the overall community, that of the promo-
tion of general industrial development in the wake of displace-
ment caused by other clearance projects.
The most important recent New York case, and that which
of all American decisions is perhaps most like Poletown, is the
1975 case of Yonkers Community Development Agency v. Mor-
ris." The Otis Elevator Company, one of the city's largest em-
ployers, threatened to leave the area because of lack of space to
expand and modernize its facilities.129 The city, in order to per-
suade the company to remain, offered three sites, but Otis
deemed none of them to be suitable.3 0 Finally, the property in
question in the case, that adjoining Otis' old factory, was se-
lected by the city and approved by the company.' 31 The city
then sought to acquire the property, to clear and prepare the
land for redevelopment, and to sell it to Otis. 3 2 The opinion ap-
proving the plan deserves careful attention. The court noted
that there could be only two possible justifications for this pro-
ject, one conventional and the other more extreme and possibly
unconstitutional. " " The first was that the sale to Otis could be
justified as an incidental benefit to Otis resulting from its partic-
ipation in a large-scale plan of slum clearance:
Where [the] land is found to be substandard, its taking for urban
renewal is for a public purpose. . .. The fact that the vehicle for
renewed use of the land, once it is taken, may be a private agency
does not in and of itself change the permissible nature of the tak-
128. 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975), af'g 45 A.D.2d 889,
357 N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dep't 1974), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1010 (1975).
129. Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 45 A.D.2d at 890, 357 N.Y.S.2d at
889 (Munder, J., dissenting).
130. Id. (Munder, J., dissenting).
131. Id. (Munder, J., dissenting).
132. Id. at 890, 357 N.Y.S.2d at 889-90 (Munder, J., dissenting).
133. Yonkers Community Dev. Agency v. Morris, 37 N.Y.2d at 482, 335 N.E.2d at
331, 373 N.Y.S.2d at 117.
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ing of the substandard property.'"
The second was that the sale could be justified solely on the
basis that assistance to this specific company was in the wider
community interest:
Of course, if property has not been determined to be substan-
dard in an urban renewal context, it may not be taken in eminent
domain unless it is proved that its taking was for another public
purpose and, if there was also a private benefit involved, that the
public purpose was dominant.1" '
In this case, the land had been declared to be blighted by the
local city council and planning board.13 6 Therefore, the partici-
pation of Otis in the project was justified under the indirect ben-
efit exception to the general rule, as a private benefit incidental
to the larger public purpose of slum clearance.137 Having found
the overall plan to be a lawful urban renewal program, the court
did not reach the second possible justification. All that can be
said safely is that the court left open for future cases the possi-
bility that circumstances could arise wherein direct governmen-
tal assistance to a private enterprise by means of eminent do-
main could be considered constitutional solely as a public
benefit to the community at large, absent a finding that the
property to be condemned was blighted. " '
Recent cases from jurisdictions other than New York have
developed rules of law similar to those which emerged from Can-
nata and Morris."9 The most instructive recent case is a 1982
decision from Maryland, Mayor and City Council of Baltimore
v. Chertkoff.140 The condemnee in this case owned land near a
river in an old, deteriorated city neighborhood which he leased
to a company that operated a concrete batching plant.'4 ' The
city proposed to condemn this and other land for the purpose of
134. Id.
135. Id.
136. Id.
137. Id.
138. Id.
139. See, e.g., State v. Miami Beach Redev. Agency, 392 So. 2d 875 (Fla. 1981); In re
City of Seattle, 96 Wash. 2d 616, 638 P.2d 549 (1981).
140. 293 Md. 32, 441 A.2d 1044 (1982).
141. Id. at 36-37, 441 A.2d at 1048.
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developing the area for recreation. ' 2 An additional aspect of the
plan was the elimination of industry incompatible with the
nearby recreation area and the encouragement of industry which
would be compatible. 43 The city, in fact, intended to sell the
condemnee's land to his neighbor who operated a glass manufac-
turing plant, a use which the city deemed to be compatible with
the overall plan.1'4 The court approved of the redevelopment
plan, but on the grounds that the neighbor's private benefit was
incidental to the plan's primary purpose, slum clearance and
general redevelopment:
Manifestly, if the ... ordinance was devised simply as a vehicle
to condemn Chertkof's property for the private use of [his neigh-
bor] for reasons unassociated with the public purposes underlying
urban renewal programs, the taking would not be "in furtherance
of a genuine renewal plan" and would not therefore be for a pub-
lic purpose. 145
III. Analysis
In summary, two related exceptions emerge from the cases
decided on the issue of the limitations on the governmental use
of eminent domain in aid of private enterprise throughout
American history. The first, which includes, for example, older
and more recent cases involving railroads, mills, irrigation and
drainage projects, and port development, requires that the pri-
vate business be indispensable to the community at large and
that the direct governmental assistance by means of condemna-
tion be indispensable to the particular business. The second,
which is limited to recent cases involving urban renewal, re-
quires that the benefit gained by a private company which par-
ticipates in a redevelopment project be incidental to the primary
public purpose of slum clearance. The Poletown Neighborhood
Council v. City of Detroit'14 decision falls within neither of these
exceptions. It is the first decision of its kind and the most radi-
142. Id. at 38, 441 A.2d at 1049.
143. Id. at 40, 441 A.2d at 1050.
144. Id. at 41, 441 A.2d at 1050.
145. Id. at 44, 441 A.2d at 1052 (quoting Master Royalties v. Baltimore, 235 Md. 74,
88, 369 A.2d 652, 659 (1964)).
146. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
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cal eminent domain decision since the public purpose barrier
was first clearly established in the mid to late nineteenth cen-
tury.14 7 But a question can be raised as to whether the decision,
although without legal precedent, is nonetheless a good one.
Why should it not be considered a justifiably activist judicial re-
sponse to the necessity of economic recovery?
In order to understand why the Poletown decision is not
only unprecedented but exceeds constitutional boundaries, it is
necessary to appreciate the importance of the public purpose
barrier to the exercise of the power of eminent domain in the
American scheme of constitutional liberty. It is commonly said,
in accordance with the literal language of the fifth amendment
and similar state constitutional provisions, that the public pur-
pose limitation protects property and not liberty. But this literal
reading fails to take into account the fact that eighteenth cen-
tury notions of property rights and liberty, although not identi-
cal, were more closely interrelated than those notions are now. 14 8
Even today, the public purpose barrier not only protects prop-
erty in the strict sense of the term but also certain very basic
liberties. The liberty protected by the public purpose barrier
was well understood and cherished by the drafters of the Bill of
Rights. 149 The ideas which epitomized the thinking of the revo-
lutionaries were that governments of all kinds tended towards
growth at the expense of individual liberties and that a constitu-
tional government of limited and delegated powers was the kind
of government least likely to grow large and oppress liberty.15 0
147. See M. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 259-61 (1977). "Dur-
ing the 1840s and 1850s judges everywhere began to turn away from the view that a
public purpose inhered in any state promoted activity that simply increased the gross
national product." Id. at 261.
148. "Government is instituted no less for protection of the property, than of the
persons, of individuals." THE FEDERALIST No. 54, at 370 (J. Madison) (J. Cooke ed. 1961).
149. Madison's draft of what is now the fifth amendment included an eminent do-
main clause: "No person shall be ... obliged to relinquish his property, where it may be
necessary for public use, without a just compensation." 1 ANNALS OF CONG. 433-36 (J.
Gales, Sr. ed. 1834).
150. According to Tribe:
[T]he state or federal government as a whole had no power to act outside its right-
ful jurisdiction to intrude upon the "natural rights" reserved to the people within
the private domain or to trench upon the prerogatives of other governmental de-
partments. Rights belonging to citizens by virtue of their very citizenship, includ-
ing personal security, personal liberty, and private property, would thus be pre-
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In the eighteenth century, as had been true throughout the en-
tire development of the common law constitutional tradition,
hard won property rights stood literally and symbolically be-
tween an overreaching government and the liberty of the peo-
ple."'1 The drafters of the Bill of Rights had a long tradition of
constitutional struggle upon which to draw. The Magna Carta in
1215, for example, included five articles against unjustified tak-
ings.152 The Petition of Right in 1627, which sought redress
against the oppressive policies of King James I and later served
as a rallying point for parliamentarians during the English Civil
War, sought relief against unauthorized royal demands for gifts,
loans, benevolences, taxes, or "such like charge."" 3 To the revo-
served not only by decentralization of power and mutually checking forces . ..
but by rules enforceable in the proper tribunals at the behest of threatened
citizens.
L. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 427 (1978) (footnote omitted).
151.
The more one examines these early explanations of the constitutional purpose of
the taking provision, the clearer it becomes that the protection afforded is most
properly viewed as a guarantee against unfair or arbitrary government. Story, for
example, stated that the compensation provision, 'is laid down by jurists as a prin-
ciple of universal law [because] in a free government, almost all other rights would
become worthless, if the government possessed an uncontrollable power over the
private fortune of every citizen.'
Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36, 60 (1964) (quoting 2 J. STORY,
CONSTITUTION 547-48 (4th ed. 1873) (emphasis added)).
152. Great Charter of Liberties, in SELECT DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CONsTrrrIIONAL
HISTORY 42 (G. Adams & H. Stephens eds. 1927). The articles read as follows:
28. No constable or other bailiff of ours shall take any one's grain or other chat-
tels, without immediately paying for them in money, unless he is able to obtain a
postponement at the goodwill of the seller.
29. No constable shall require any knight to give money in place of his ward of a
castle if he is willing to furnish that ward in his own person or through another
honest man, if he himself is not able to do it for a reasonable cause; and if we shall
lead or send him into the army he shall be free from ward in proportion to the
amount of time during which he has been in the army through us.
30. No sheriff or bailiff of ours or any one else shall take horses or wagons of any
free man for carrying purposes except on the permission of that free man.
31. Neither we nor our bailiffs will take the wood of another man for castles, or for
anything else which we are doing, except by the permission of him to whom the
wood belongs.
32. We will not hold the lands of those convicted of a felony for more than a year
and a day, after which the lands shall be returned to the lords of the fiefs.
Id. at 46.
153. Petition of Right, 1628, 3 Car., ch. 1., in SLECr DOCUMENTS OF ENGLISH CON-
STITUTIONAL HISTORY 339 (G. Adams & H. Stephens eds. 1927).
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lutionary generation, therefore, limiting the power of govern-
mental takings to public purposes was a traditional and neces-
sary means of protecting individual liberty by limiting the power
of and thus the potential for oppression by the government. Al-
though notions of liberty today are more complex and less tied
to property rights than during the eighteenth century, the prin-
ciple remains the same. The public purpose barrier today, as al-
ways, marks one of the critical constitutional boundaries be-
tween the individual and the power of the state.
The public purpose barrier to the use of eminent domain,
therefore, is a basic component of the American scheme of con-
stitutional liberty. But like all rules of law, it has been the sub-
ject of judicially recognized exceptions. This Article has de-
scribed the history of these exceptions since the mid-nineteenth
century. The fundamental question raised here, however, has yet
to be answered. Why is Poletown bad law? Is it not a relatively
small step from the exceptions recognized in Cannata v. City of
New York'" and Yonkers Community Development Agency v.
Morris15 5 to the situation in Poletown? Is Poletown an idea
whose time has come?
The answer to the question of why Poletown sets dangerous
precedent cannot be found in the brief language of the federal or
state constitutions but in the wider experience of political and
economic life. The answer is to be found in the fact that the
public purpose barrier is a critical pillar not only of constitu-
tional notions of political liberty but of economic liberalism as
well. What is meant by the term "economic liberalism" in this
context is the century or more long American tradition of a com-
petitive but regulated market economy. The best explanation of
why condemnation for the purpose of assisting private enter-
prise violates the spirit of economic liberalism is found in the
cases which have considered the issue explicitly.
The importance of the public purpose barrier to the spirit of
economic liberalism is explained well by Judge Cooley in People
154. 24 Misc. 2d 694, 204 N.Y.S.2d 982 (Sup. Ct. 1960), rev'd on other grounds, 14
A.D.2d 813, 221 N.Y.S.2d 457 (2d Dep't 1961), aff'd, 11 N.Y.2d 210, 182 N.E.2d 395, 227
N.Y.S.2d 903, appeal dismissed, 371 U.S. 4 (1962).
155. 37 N.Y.2d 478, 335 N.E.2d 327, 373 N.Y.S.2d 112 (1975), aff'g 45 A.D.2d 889,
357 N.Y.S.2d 887 (2d Dep't 1974), appeal dismissed, 423 U.S. 1010 (1975).
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ex rel. Detroit & Howell Railroad v. Township Board of Sa-
lem, 156 the 1870 Michigan case which held that direct govern-
mental assistance by means of taxation was no longer indispen-
sable to the development of railroads and, therefore, that such
governmental projects were in violation of the constitutional
prohibition against takings for a private purpose.157 Of critical
importance here is the fact that the court considered the dispos-
itive issue to be similar to that found in cases involving eminent
domain. Judge Cooley's attitude towards the public purpose bar-
rier was far from conservative. In fact, he urged judges to inter-
pret this constitutional provision very liberally: "[W]ise states-
manship must look beyond the expenditures which are
absolutely needful to the continued existence of organized gov-
ernment, and embrace others which may tend to make that gov-
ernment subserve the general well-being of society, and advance
the present and prospective happiness and prosperity of the
people. "5 8
But even this high degree of liberality must have its limit,
and the limit is reached when the powers of taxation or eminent
domain are exercised primarily for private economic advantage.
The spirit of economic liberalism does not easily tolerate govern-
mental interference with the competitive market in order to aid
a single private business, even if that business is important to
the community. With respect to this point, Judge Cooley's opin-
ion is worth quoting at length:
By common consent also a large portion of the most urgent needs
of society are relegated exclusively to the law of demand and sup-
ply. It is this in its natural operation, and without the interfer-
ence of the government, that gives us the proper proportion of
tillers of the soil, artisans, manufacturers, merchants and profes-
sional men, and that determines when and where they shall give
to society the benefit of their particular services. However great
the need in the direction of any particular calling, the interfer-
ence of the government is not tolerated, because, though it might
supplying a public want, it is considered as invading the domain
that belongs exclusively to private inclination and enterprise.' 5'
156. 20 Mich. 452 (1870).
157. Id. at 492-94.
158. Id. at 475.
159. Id. at 484-85.
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He wrote that the term "public purpose" as regards taxation
"has no relation to the urgency of the public need or to the...
public benefit [that would] follow."1 0 It is merely a term used to
distinguish "the objects for which, according to settled usage,
the government is to provide, from those which, by the like us-
age, are left to private inclination, interest or liberality.' 61
A similar denunciation of direct governmental aid to private
enterprise arose in Citizens' Savings & Loan Ass'n v. Topeka,""
decided by the Supreme Court of the United States in 1874.
This case challenged the issuance of bonds which were made
payable by the city to an iron works company for the purpose of
aiding and encouraging that company to remain in Topeka.6 3 In
the process of declaring the bonds to have been issued without a
public purpose, the Court wrote:
[I]n the case before us, in which the towns are authorized to con-
tribute aid by way of taxation to any class of manufacturers,
there is no difficulty in holding that this is not such a public pur-
pose... . If it be said that a benefit results to the local public of
a town by establishing manufacturers, the same may be said of
any other business or pursuit which employs capital or labor. The
merchant, the mechanic, the inn-keeper, the banker, the builder,
the steamboat owner are equally promoters of the public good,
and equally deserving the aid of the citizens by forced contribu-
tions. No line can be drawn in favor of the manufacturer which
would not open the coffers of the public treasury to the importu-
nities of two-thirds of the business men of the city or town.'"
Recent cases have continued to recognize the fundamental
importance to economic liberalism of the public purpose barrier
to the exercise of eminent domain. A particularly instructive re-
cent example is City of Owensboro v. McCormick,'6" decided by
the Supreme Court of Kentucky in 1979. The plaintiffs here
sought to have the Kentucky Local Industrial Development Au-
thority Act' 66 declared unconstitutional. 67 The Act provided for
160. Id. at 485.
161. Id. (emphasis omitted).
162. 87 U.S. (20 Wall.) 655 (1874).
163. Id. at 656.
164. Id. at 665.
165. 581 S.W.2d 3 (Ky. 1979).
166. Ky. RaV. STAT. §§ 152.810-.930 (1980).
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the creation of local authorities whose purpose was to develop
industrial sites, parks, and subdivisions. 868 Under the Act, cities
would have the power to condemn any private property for the
benefit of the authority, so that the authority could in turn con-
vey that land to a private owner for industrial or commercial
development.' 9 The court declared the Act to be unconstitu-
167. City of Owensboro v. McCormick, 581 S.W.2d at 4.
168. The Kentucky statute provides in relevant part:
152.820. Purpose. - The purpose of KRS 152.810 to 152.930 is to create local
industrial development authorities to aid in the acquisition, retention and devel-
opment of land for industrial and commercial purposes in Kentucky; to aid in the
development and promotion of industrial sites, parks and subdivisions for accom-
modating industrial and commercial needs; to promote and stimulate the acquisi-
tion, retention and development of land for industrial and commercial purposes in
Kentucky by other local development organizations both public and private ..
152.830. Establishment of local industrial development authority. - (1) Any gov-
ernmental unit by act of its legislative body may establish a nonprofit industrial
development authority to be composed of six (6) members. (2) The authority shall
be a body politic and corporate with the usual corporate attributes, and in its
corporate name may sue and be sued, contract and be contracted with and do all
things reasonable or necessary to effectively carry out the duty prescribed by KRS
152.810 to 152.930.
152.840. Functions of authority. - (1) The purpose, duties and powers of the au-
thority shall be to: (a) Acquire, retain and develop land for industrial and com-
mercial purposes in Kentucky; aid in the development of the industrial and com-
mercial sites, parks and subdivisions to meet industrial and commercial needs in
Kentucky. (b) Encourage the acquisition, retention and development of land for
industrial and commercial needs in Kentucky by other local development organi-
zations, both public and private. (c) Cooperate with the U.S. Army Corps of Engi-
neers and other federal agencies in formulating development plans and in acquir-
ing and developing land for industrial and commercial purposes in accordance
with these plans.
Ky. Rav. STAT. §§ 152.820-.840(1)(c) (1980).
169. Section 152.840(1)(d) gives the authority the power to
[aicquire by contract, lease, purchase, gift, condemnation or otherwise any real or
personal property, or rights therein, necessary or suitable for establishing indus-
trial sites, parks or subdivisions. . . . The authority may sell or convey any or all
land owned or optioned by it to any public or private organization, governmental
unit, or industry for the purpose of constructing and/or operating any industrial
or commercial facility. Provided, however, that no sale or conveyance of any land
shall be made to a private organization or industry without such organization or
industry first having executed a written contract with the authority providing that
if no actual construction of an industrial facility is commenced within two (2)
years, the organization or industry shall reconvey the land, free and clear of liens
and encumbrances, to the authority, and the authority shall return to the organi-
zation or industry 95 percent (95%) of the purchase price paid therefor.
Id. § 152.840(1)(d).
Section 152.850, however, places limitations on the condemnation power.
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tional to the extent that it granted cities or other governmental
units the unconditional right to condemn private property for
this purpose. 17 0 It explained its decision in much the same man-
ner as had Judge Cooley, over 100 years earlier:
Naked and unconditional governmental power to compel a citi-
zen to surrender his productive and attractive property to an-
other citizen who will use it predominantly for his own private
profit just because such alternative private use is thought to be
preferable in the subjective notion of governmental authorites is
repugnant to our constitutional protections .... 1
The court further explained that the only constitutionally
permissable way for private enterprise to acquire the private
property of another by means of a governmental scheme involv-
ing the exercise of the power of eminent domain is for the busi-
ness to participate incidentally in a broader program of urban
renewal. 172
The Poletown decision is bad law because it sanctions a
plan whose primary purpose was the business advantage of a
single company. As noted by the dissent in Poletown, unlike pre-
vious Michigan decisions17 3 no requirement of governmental
Notwithstanding any other provision or section of KRS 152.810 to 152.930, no
governmental unit shall have the power to condemn property under KRS 152.810
to 152.930 unless the governmental unit has first given proper public notice as
required by law stating the specific purpose for which the property to be con-
demned shall be used and said purposes shall be pleaded and proved in such con-
demnation action. The property shall be developed within a period of five (5)
years pursuant to the purpose stated, and the failure of the authority to so de-
velop shall entitle the person or persons whose property was condemned to repur-
chase the property at the price the authority paid to the governmental unit for the
same. The person from whom the land is taken by condemnation shall have the
right to re-aquire the land as aforementioned by application to the court of com-
petent jurisdiction, if such procedure be necessary, and shall be entitled to recov-
ery of his costs and reasonable attorney's fees necessary to re-acquire said land.
Id. § 152.850.
170. Although the government urged adoption of an expansive version of "public
purpose" as used in cases involving revenue bonds issued for the acquisition of industrial
property or public funds expended to promote industrial development by attracting new
industry to all parts of the state, the court would not equate "public benefit" or "public
purpose" to "public use" in the eminent domain sense. City of Owensboro v. McCormick,
581 S.W.2d at 5.
171. Id.
172. Id. at 7.
173. See Detroit Int'l Bridge Co. v. American Seed Co., 249 Mich. 289, 296, 228
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control or continuing accountability to the public was demanded
of General Motors to ensure that the promised public benefit
would come to fruition. 174 This was undoubtedly due to General
Motors' superior bargaining position. 175 Though the Supreme
Court found that a second requirement was satisfied for the ex-
ercise of eminent domain in Michigan, i.e., that the taking of the
affected property be necessary to the objective purpose of the
undertaking, 7 e it should be noted that this necessity was cre-
ated by General Motors itself when it prescribed specifications
for the plant site which must be met in order for the city to
forestall relocation. 7 7 The folly of this decision and the wisdom
of the rule it breaks is well illustrated by the events which have
taken place in the automobile industry, in Detroit and nation-
wide since 1981. At the time of the Poletown decision, Detroit
needed employment for its citizens and General Motors needed
to build a modern factory in order to make the smaller cars
thought necessary to compete with foreign manufacturers and to
cope with the steep rise in gasoline prices. Only two years later,
however, things have changed. Automobile sales and profits are
up.' 78 Employment is increasing. T17  Americans, moreover, are
N.W. 791, 793 (1930) (imposing on corporations an obligation to preserve public pur-
pose); Berrien Springs Water-Power Co. v. Berrien Circuit Judge, 133 Mich. 48, 53, 94
N.W. 379, 380-81 (1903) ("Land cannot be taken, under the exercise of the power of
eminent domain, unless, after it is taken, it will be devoted to the use of the public,
independent of the will of the corporation taking it." (citations omitted)); Board of
Health v. Van Hoesen, 87 Mich. 533, 539, 49 N.W. 894, 896 (1891) ("[T]he state must
have a voice in the manner in which the public may avail itself of that use."); Swan v.
Williams, 2 Mich. 427, 440 (1852) ("By the terms of the charter the title to the lands is
contingent upon their occupation as a railroad.").
174. "[Tlhere are no guarantees from General Motors about employment levels at
the new assembly plant ... " Poletown, 410 Mich. at 679, 304 N.W.2d at 480 (Ryan, J.,
dissenting). See supra notes 29-30 and accompanying text.
175. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 652, 655, 304 N.W.2d at 467, 469 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
176. See Ryerson v. Brown, 35 Mich. 333, 339 (1877); People ex rel. Detroit &
Howell R.R. v. Township Bd. of Salem, 20 Mich. 452, 480 (1870).
177. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 676, 304 N.W.2d at 478 (Ryan, J., dissenting).
178. A short three years after Poletown, the auto industry announced a remarkable
recovery.
The industry reported today that it continued its rebound last year from the worst
sales slump since World War 11, selling 6,786,977 cars for the year, an increase of
17.9 percent over the 5,756,658 sold in 1982. Including import sales of 2,368,764, a
total of 9,155,741 cars were sold in the United States in 1983, making it the best
sales year since 1979, when 10.5 million were sold.
Holusha, Detroit Closes Out A Banner Year, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1984, at D6, col. 2.
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again demanding big cars. The small car boom which prompted
General Motors' desire for expansion and innovation is already
over.lso The taking of Poletown by the city has contributed
nothing to the growing profit recovery of General Motors.181 The
best and worst efforts of government notwithstanding, this re-
covery is due primarily to the same complicated market forces
which have caused competitive market economies to experience
inevitable waves of boom and bust over time. The plan approved
in Poletown violates the spirit of economic liberalism by dis-
torting the operation of these mysterious but inexorable market
forces on behalf of one particular company. Though these results
are seen through the visual acuity of hindsight, they are none-
theless predictable and should serve as a lesson to future courts
faced with similar questions. Detroit may never be able to show
that the Poletown taking created many jobs. ' A few things are
certain, however. Poletown, previously a stable, lower middle
179. The unemployment rate in the third quarter of 1982 was 10.6% whereas in the
third quarter of 1983, unemployment dropped to 8.1%. N.Y. Times, Jan. 15, 1984, at F14
(Week in Business, Data Bank), col. 4.
180. "The scant 6.7 percent increase in American car sales so far this year conceals
the best part for Detroit, that sales of big cars are running ahead of this average." Peter-
son, In Motor City, Prosperity May Not Be Just Around The Corner, N.Y. Times, June
25, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
181. "G.M. said its 1983 sales rose 15.3 percent, to 4,053,561, from 3,515,660." Ho-
lusha, Detroit Closes Out A Banner Year, N.Y. Times, Jan. 6, 1984, at D13, col. 2. Gen-
eral Motors is not expected to begin operating its Poletown plant until 1984. Telephone
interview with an editor of the Detroit Free Press (Jan. 4, 1984).
182. The Poletown plant will take over the manufacturing done at the present De-
troit plants. The Fleetwood Fisher Body & Clark Avenue Cadillac plant will close with
the resultant loss of 10,000 jobs. The Poletown plant will replace 6000 jobs leaving a loss
of 4000 positions. Betzold, Push Comes to Shove, Detroit Metro Times, Nov. 13, 1980, at
8, col. 1. Moreover, at the time of the Poletown taking, no attempt was made by Detroit
to insure that new jobs would be created in the Poletown plant. One possibility would
have been to have contract negotiations with General Motors to insure an acceptable or
threshold level of employment for Detroit residents. Note, Real Property - Eminent
Domain - Expansion of the Public Use Doctrine to Include the Alleviation of Unem-
ployment and Revitalization of the Economic Base of a Community, 28 WAYNE L. REV.
1975, 1994 (1983). As perhaps as a direct result of this omission by Detroit, indications
are that although sales are up at General Motors the increased productivity has been
performed by workers doing "overtime." Peterson, In Motor City, Prosperity May Not
Be Just Around The Corner, N.Y. Times, June 25, 1983, at 6, col. 1.
Another trend also does not bode well for the increased employment of Detroit resi-
dents by General Motors. By 1985, General Motors will have 5000 robots in operation.
By 1990, an estimated 14,000 robots will be doing jobs formerly held by workers. G.M.
Takes on the Japanese, NEWSWEEK, May 11, 1981, at 56.
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and working class community, is no more. Because the standards
of valuation used to calculate compensation for the exercise of
the power of eminent domain fall below true full market
value, 183 the former residents doubtlessly lost wealth, as well as a
way of life they had enjoyed until the bulldozers arrived. Gen-
eral Motors, regardless of whatever good or bad fortune may be-
fall the planned expansion site, has unquestionably gained
wealth and market advantage. It acquired for $8 million a valua-
ble property which it otherwise could not have acquired and
which cost the city $200 million to condemn and prepare for de-
velopment.18 4 In other words, the only certain result of the
Poletown plan is that one of the largest corporations in the
world gained a great amount of wealth and that many small peo-
ple lost much of what they had.
IV. Conclusion
The Poletown condemnation was oppressive to property
rights and to liberty and violates the spirit of economic liber-
alism. Even more disturbing is what appears to be a general ju-
dicial trend in favor of ever wider uses of the power of eminent
domain, sometimes at the expense of individual rights. Almost
twenty years ago, Professor Joseph Sax warned in an influential
article that the overreaching use of eminent domain leads to tyr-
anny. 1 85 Several years later, Professor Frank Michelman simi-
larly warned that judges deciding taking cases should be more
careful to protect the individual from excessive governmental
schemes. 8 But these sentiments are not unanimous in the aca-
demic community, or among the members of the bar and bench.
Professor William Stoebuck, for example, has written that the
power of eminent domain should be effectively unlimited:
The conclusion is that there is no sufficient reason to limit the
exercise of eminent domain any more than of other powers of
183. See, e.g., Berger, The Public Use Requirement in Eminent Domain, 57 OR. L.
REV. 203, 243, 245 (1978) (suggesting that condemnees in private takings be allowed
150% of market value of the land acquired since markets tend to undervalue a private
landowner's interest).
184. Poletown, 410 Mich. at 656, 304 N.W.2d at 469.
185. Sax, Takings and the Police Power, 74 YALE L.J. 36 (1964).
186. Michelman, Property, Utility, and Fairness: Comments on the Ethical Foun-
dations of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 HARV. L. REV. 1165 (1967).
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government. All exercises, including regulations and taxations, are
intrusions upon individual liberty, but they are necessary to pre-
vent greater human losses in an interdependent society. Eminent
domain poses no special threat to the individual that would re-
quire special limitations on the occasions of its exercise.1 87
The ironic aftermath of the Poletown Neighborhood Coun-
cil v. City of Detroit 88 decision shows that Sax and Michelman
were correct to urge vigilance. Stoebuck is mistaken. The power
of eminent domain must be more narrowly exercised than other
powers of government because in cases involving the exercise of
the power of eminent domain a relatively few individuals bear
the total burden, whereas the burden in cases involving regula-
tion and taxation is more widely shared. Regulation and taxa-
tion can be crushing, but the power of eminent domain exercised
in Poletown was obliterating. Regulations can be repealed and
taxes can be refunded, but condemnation is irreversible. The
constitutional barriers against the overreaching exercise of the
power of eminent domain are worthy of careful protection.
187. Stoebuck, A General Theory of Eminent Domain, 47 WASH. L. REV. 553, 597
(1972).
188. 410 Mich. 616, 304 N.W.2d 455 (1981).
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